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The Rise of the Novice Cabinet Minister? 
The Career Trajectories of Cabinet Ministers in British Government from 
Attlee to Cameron 
   
Some commentators have observed that today’s Cabinet ministers are younger and less 
experienced than their predecessors. To test this claim, we analyse the data for Labour and 
Conservative appointments to Cabinet since 1945. Although we find some evidence of a 
decline in average age and prior experience, it is less pronounced than for the party leaders. 
We then examine the data for junior ministerial appointments, which reveals that there is no 
trend towards youth and inexperience present lower down the hierarchy. Taking these 
findings together, we propose that public profile is correlated with ‘noviceness’; that is, the 
more prominent the role, the younger and less experienced its incumbent is likely to be. If 
this is correct, then the claim that we are witnessing the rise of the novice Cabinet minister is 
more a consequence of the personalisation of politics than evidence of an emerging ‘cult of 
youth’. 
 
Keywords: Cabinet ministers; junior ministers; party leaders; ministerial selection; 
personalisation; symbolic leadership 
 
Introduction 
 
In a recent article, Philip Cowley identified the rise of the novice political leader as a ‘major 
development’ in British politics. Noting the youth and parliamentary inexperience of David 
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Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg at the point at which they acquired the leadership of 
their parties, Cowley concluded that: ‘the British now prefer their leaders younger than they 
used to [and] that this is evidence of some developing cult of youth in British politics’, with 
the desire for younger candidates inevitably meaning that they are less experienced. Cowley 
dismissed the idea that this could be by ‘chance’ or a ‘fluke’, before identifying the difference 
between Cameron, Miliband and Clegg, and their post-war predecessors. Whereas the 
average age and parliamentary experience of post-war Conservative party leaders at the point 
when they acquired the party leadership was 54 years old and with 22 years’ parliamentary 
experience, Cameron was 39 and had four years’ parliamentary experience. For Labour 
leaders there was a similar pattern: Miliband was 41 with five years’ parliamentary 
experience, whereas his post-war predecessors were on average 52 years old and had 19 
years’ parliamentary experience. The picture for the Liberal Democrats (and Liberals and 
SDP) was more complicated, but nonetheless a similar pattern could be identified. Clegg, at 
the age of 40 and with only two years in Parliament, differed from the post-war average of 49 
years old and 16 years’ parliamentary experience.1  
Cowley is not alone in identifying a trend towards youth and a reduced emphasis on 
parliamentary experience. In a recent study on leaders of the opposition, it was noted that 
there was a considerable decline in age and parliamentary experience since the early 1980s. 
The willingness of former Prime Ministers to continue in office after electoral rejection had 
meant that between 1945 and 1983 the average age of leaders of the opposition, at the point 
of acquiring the position, was 58 years old, and their average parliamentary experience was 
24 years. The reduced tolerance of electoral failure within parties has meant that leadership 
changes have occurred more often since 1983, and the average age and parliamentary 
experience has fallen to 45 and 12 years respectively 2 
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In contrast, the impact of age and parliamentary experience on the selection of 
Cabinet ministers has not resulted in that much academic appraisal. The influence of Rose’s 
1971 paper on the making of Cabinet ministers may have fuelled this neglect. Rose identified 
how in the period from 1868 to 1958 the median minister spent about 14 years in Parliament 
before entering Cabinet. Furthermore when considering post war ministers, and the 
experiences of the Wilson and Heath governments, Rose concluded that ‘the recruitment and 
career backgrounds of its most senior political members’ had ‘not only remained 
overwhelmingly similar to that established over the last hundred years’ but had ‘if anything 
moved slightly towards more orthodoxy in terms of parliamentary and administrative 
experience’.3 So while there is a considerable literature on ministerial selection in British 
Government, these works make passing references to the importance of age when assessing 
ministerial preferment. The focus of these studies varies, but have included the balances and 
constraints regarding Cabinet and ministerial formation; the power of Prime Ministerial 
dismissal; length of ministerial tenure and resignations; ministerial turnover and reshuffles; 
and junior ministerial office and career trajectories for Cabinet ministers.4  
However, Cowley has stimulated an academic debate that feeds off the diaries of 
Chris Mullin and his references to New Labour’s obsession with youth. For example, when 
commenting upon Gordon Brown’s first Cabinet, Mullin complained that Jack Straw ‘is the 
only Cabinet minister on the wrong side of 60; several of the new boys and girls are in their 
thirties and have only been in Parliament for five minutes’. Condemning this perceived 
emphasis on youth, Mullin argued that ‘there should be a limit to the number of clever young 
men and women on the inside track’, as ‘there is merit in hanging on to a few fifty-
somethings who can remember what happened last time around’.5 These insights feed into a 
wider argument that Cowley appears to be engaging in – i.e. that the value of Parliament as a 
‘place where would be leaders are tested and tried out appears to be on the wane’, and that it 
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is hard to see how leading frontbenchers have gone through ‘much of a parliamentary 
apprenticeship en route to the top’ They also appear to reaffirm the arguments about the rise 
of the career politician and its consequences, so eloquently analysed for an academic 
audience by King, and later for a wider readership by Riddell.6 
Are Mullin’s observations anecdotal or is there a clear trend towards youth and 
inexperience amongst those who reach Cabinet level? To address this question, we analyse 
the data for Labour and Conservative appointments to Cabinet since 1945. Here, we find 
some evidence of a decline in average age and prior experience, but it is less pronounced than 
for the party leaders. To ascertain whether the same pattern is present lower down the 
ministerial hierarchy, we then assess the extent to which junior ministers are becoming 
younger and less experienced on first appointment. Finally, we reflect on what the debate 
over ‘noviceness’ can tell us about contemporary British politics.  
 
Comparisons from Attlee to Cameron  
            
Not since the publication of Alderman and Cross’s article on ‘rejuvenating the Cabinet’ in 
1986 has there been a systematic evaluation of the age profiles of Cabinet ministers in British 
government. Alderman and Cross identified the average age of the Cabinet at the beginning 
and the end of Prime Ministerial terms of office. Across the ten Prime Ministerial tenures that 
they assessed (from Clement Attlee to the end of Margaret Thatcher’s first Cabinet), they 
calculated that five Prime Ministers saw the average age decrease at the end of their tenure: 
Attlee 1945-51 (61 y 8 m to 58y 11m); Churchill 1951-55 (58y 6m to 58y, 0m); Anthony 
Eden 1955-57 (56y, 6m to 55y 3m); Harold Macmillan 1957-63 (53y 1m to 52y 2m) and the 
first Harold Wilson government 1964-1970 (57y 3m to 56y 0m). The other five Prime 
Ministers had an older Cabinet at the end of their tenure than at the beginning: Alec Douglas-
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Home 1963-64 (50y 9m to 51y 9m); Edward Heath 1970-74 (51y 8m to 53 2m); the second 
Wilson era 1974-76 (54y 8m to 57y 1 m); James Callaghan 1976-79 (54y 5 m to 54y 9m) and 
the first Thatcher government (53y 8 m to 55y 0m).7 
Rather than replicate Alderman and Cross’s study and update the data from 1983 
onwards, we take a slightly different approach. Instead of calculating the average age of the 
Cabinet at the beginning and end of the prime ministerial tenure, we seek to identify the 
average age and experience at which ministers are promoted to the Cabinet. This reflects our 
objective of assessing the novice leader theory that Cowley is advancing. That means that we 
have identified all of those who reached Cabinet level since 1945, and then noted both their 
age and their parliamentary experience at the point when they first reached Cabinet.  
Table One demonstrates that a trend towards youth and inexperience is evident when 
considering Cabinet appointments by Labour Prime Ministers. Under each respective Labour 
Prime Minister the average age was declining, with a sharper decline evident when 
considering the appointments made by Gordon Brown. This trend was replicated when 
considering parliamentary experience. It is also worth noting that the data for Tony Blair’s 
appointments is distorted by the impact of his first Cabinet in 1997. The composition of this 
was shaped by his need to accept the results of the shadow Cabinet elections of late 1996, and 
the fact that many Labour parliamentarians were older and had more parliamentary 
experience than would normally be the case as they had been in opposition for so long. The 
first Blair Cabinet (21 members from the House of Commons) had an average age just over 
51 years old and with 16 years’ parliamentary experience. Between 1998 and 2006 the 
remaining 27 Cabinet appointments that Blair made had a lower average age (47 years old) 
and significantly less parliamentary experience (just over 9 years). Therefore, the 
appointments that Brown made were following the trend established by Blair. Blair and 
Brown thus used their appointments to fast track favoured insiders who were supportive of 
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their faction. In the case of Blair there was Stephen Byers (45 years old, 6 years’ experience); 
Alan Milburn (40 years old, 6 years’ experience) and David Miliband (41 years old, 5 years’ 
experience). The fast track was even swifter under Brown in the case of Ed Balls (40 years 
old, 2 years’ experience) and Ed Miliband (38 years old, 2 years’ experience). 
  
Table One: New Cabinet Appointees by Labour Prime Ministers: Average Age and Experience 
 
Prime Minister Number of 
New 
Appointments 
Average Age of 
New 
Appointments 
Average 
Experience of 
New 
Appointments 
Average Age 
of All 
Cabinet 
Ministers 
Clement Attlee (1945-51) 22 55.5 15.6 55.0 
Harold Wilson (1964-
1970) 
30 52.7 15.4 52.7 
Harold Wilson (1974-
1976) 
8 49.5 15.5 54.6 
James Callaghan (1976-
1979) 
9 49.2 11.3 52.5 
Tony Blair (1997-2007) 48 48.3 11.8 49.7 
Gordon Brown (2007-
2010) 
6 42.5 7.8 49.0 
All 123 49.6 12.9 52.0 
 
 
Table Two: New Cabinet Appointees by Conservative Prime Ministers: Average Age and 
Experience 
 
Prime Minister Number of 
New 
Appointments 
Average Age of 
New Appointments 
Average 
Experience of 
New 
Appointmnts 
Average Age of 
All Cabinet 
Ministers 
Winston Churchill (1951-
55) 
11 54.9 18.3 55.6 
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Anthony Eden (1955-57) 3 52.3 17.6 55.3 
Harold Macmillan (1957-
63) 
20 47.7 11.9 49.4 
Alec Douglas-Home 
(1963-64) 
3 43.6 10.6 50.6 
Edward Heath (1970-1974) 15 48.5 10.8 49.9 
Margaret Thatcher (1979-
1990) 
37 49.4 13.6 50.6 
John Major (1990-1997) 18 47.6 12.5 49.5 
David Cameron (2010- )  Con 23 
Lib Dem 7 
51.1 
48.7 
13.8 
10.7 
52.1 
48.7 
 
All (Conservative only)  130 49.3 13.6 51.1 
 
Within the Brown era it is interesting to note than he made no new female Cabinet 
level appointments, which was also the case with James Callaghan. In contrast, Wilson used 
his powers of patronage to advance Judith Hart (44 years old, 9 years’ experience) and 
Shirley Williams (42 years old, 10 years’ experience) considerably more quickly than the 
averages for his Prime Ministerial tenure. Similarly, Blair appointed by far the highest 
number of female Cabinet ministers of all of the post war Prime Ministers (13 out of his 48 
appointments were female). However, his reputation on gender equality and female 
representation suffers slightly from the realisation that the female average age was higher at 
49.4 years than his overall average (48.4), and that their parliamentary experience was higher 
than his overall average (13 years for women but 11.8 overall). Thus it can be said that the 
fast track under New Labour did appear to have a slight male bias within it. David Cameron 
has been criticised on gender and ministerial representation due to his limited progress 
towards one third of ministers being female.8 However, he has shown a greater willingness to 
fast track female ministers to Cabinet level, with Justine Greening (42 years old, 7 years’ 
experience); Theresa Villiers (44 years old, 7 years’ experience) and Maria Miller (48 years 
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old, 7 years’ experience) all progressing to Cabinet at an age lower than the Conservative 
average, and with considerably less parliamentary experience than their male counterparts.  
Table Two shows fluctuations in the overall data for the Conservatives. A downward 
trajectory occurs in the 1957 to 1964 period under Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-
Home. For example, in the late 1950s Macmillan fast tracked into Cabinet three people who 
would become heavyweight names of 1960s Conservative politics – Iain Macleod (44 years 
old, seven years’ experience), Reginald Maudling (40 years old, seven years’ experience), 
Edward Heath (43 years old, nine years’ experience). Moreover, the impact of the infamous 
Night of the Long Knives reshuffle of 1962 helped to ensure that the average age on reaching 
Cabinet was significantly lower in the Conservatives’ third term (1959-64) than during their 
first term (1951-55). That trend was sustained by Edward Heath but fluctuates thereafter, 
going upwards under Thatcher and then downwards again under Major. However, the 
coalition data suffers from an upward spike caused due to the long period of opposition that 
the Conservatives endured prior to returning to office in May 2010. The impact of the Liberal 
Democrats within the Cabinet makes only a small difference. Their age and experience 
averages are 48.7 years old and 10.7 years in terms of experience. Within their profile it is 
worth noting that the impact of Vince Cable (67 years old and 23 years’ parliamentary 
experience) is offset by the rapid elevations of the likes of Nick Clegg (43 years old and five 
years’ parliamentary experience) and Danny Alexander (38 years old, five years’ 
parliamentary experience).  
Overall, the average age and parliamentary experience of new Cabinet ministers in 
Conservative governments shows a small decline when comparing Churchill to Cameron, but 
with fluctuations in between not evident in the Labour data. In contrast, there is a clear 
downward trajectory from 55.5 years of age under Attlee to 42.5 under Brown, and from 15.6 
to 7.8 years of experience. Although the tendency is less pronounced in the Conservative 
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data, it should be noted that the highest averages for both were recorded by Churchill. 
Moreover, we can assume that if Cameron were to form a second administration, then there 
would be an influx of younger and less experienced Conservatives to the Cabinet. This is 
because of two clear trends that emerge from our data. First, it is clear that long periods in 
opposition will increase the averages when re-entering power – see, for example, Labour in 
1964 and notably 1997, and the Conservatives in 2010. Second, it is also clear that age and 
parliamentary experience decrease over consecutive terms of office. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the novice leader argument does carry some validity when applied to Cabinet 
appointments, but that there are party differences and that the length of time that a party has 
been in power need to be factored in before we fully embrace the novice Cabinet minister 
thesis. In the next section, we move down the ministerial hierarchy to assess the extent to 
which junior ministers are becoming younger and less experienced on first appointment.  
 
The Novice Junior Minister? 
 
Putting the contemporary debate in a broader historical context, there is evidence to suggest 
that high-fliers in British politics have always started climbing the political and ministerial 
ladder relatively young. In the 19th century, Gladstone argued that ‘as a rule, it would be as 
rational to begin training for the ballet at forty-five or fifty, as for the real testing work of the 
Cabinet.’ Thus in the period 1830-1914, those politicians who reached the Cabinet had on 
average got their first step on the ladder as junior ministers three years younger (37 compared 
to 40 years old) and after a shorter period in parliament (six rather than eight years) compared 
to those who rose no higher in the ministerial hierarchy. This pattern persisted into the 20th 
century and beyond. In the period 1945-83, the average age on first appointment of all junior 
ministers was 46, with an average of seven years on the backbenches in the Commons. Of 
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these, 50 per cent were aged between 30 and 45 years on appointment while only 12 per cent 
were over 55. However, the average age on first appointment of those who eventually 
reached the Cabinet was five to six years younger: 41 for Labour and just over 40 for 
Conservatives. Similarly, data from 1979-97 shows that those Conservative junior ministers 
under Thatcher and Major who eventually made it to the Cabinet received their first junior 
job at the average age of 42, compared to 47 for those who never got above the Parliamentary 
Secretary level. One in three of those later promoted to the Cabinet were first made junior 
ministers under the age of 40.9 
Equally, there was a strong sense in the New Labour years 1997-2010 of a favoured 
group of younger ‘golden circle’ politicians with a fast track route to preferment and senior 
jobs.  The average age on first junior minister appointment of those who went on to become 
Cabinet ministers in the New Labour era was 45, compared with 49 for those who did not get 
that far. As many as 26 per cent of those later promoted to the Cabinet were first made junior 
ministers under the age of 40, compared with just 15 per cent being over 50 at the time of 
their first appointment. The Blair and Brown years were thus part of an established pattern 
whereby anyone coming into politics at 50 years old is a virtual non-starter in the promotion 
stakes on age grounds alone, so far behind that they cannot catch up.10  
Furthermore, 12 Labour Cabinet ministers in the 1997-2010 period had at some time 
in their earlier careers before entering Parliament served as ministerial special advisers and/or 
as researchers/aides/advisers to Opposition frontbenchers (for an average of 4.7 years). This 
experience of top-level politics and policymaking was in some cases longer than their service 
as MPs prior to entering the Cabinet. Ed Balls, for instance, worked as economic adviser to 
Gordon Brown for 10 years 1994-2004, reaching the Cabinet after only two years as an MP; 
David and Ed Miliband similarly spent longer as policy researchers and special advisers 
while Labour was in Opposition and then in government than they did as MPs before they 
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were promoted to Cabinet posts. Some contemporary ministers may therefore appear 
relatively ‘inexperienced’ in terms of parliamentary experience but may nevertheless have 
accumulated important ‘insider’ experience directly relevant to their ministerial roles. 
 In sum, junior ministers who reach the Cabinet are on average younger and less 
experienced than those who progress no further, and this pattern persists across the post-war 
period. However, there is no evidence of a broader trend towards youth, as junior ministers in 
the Thatcher/Major period were appointed at a slightly younger age than those in the 
Blair/Brown era. Furthermore, the average age of today’s junior ministers on first 
appointment is in fact higher than it was in the 19th century. We also find that contemporary 
Cabinet ministers are not necessarily less experienced than their predecessors, simply that the 
type of experience they have acquired may be different.           
 
The ‘Noviceness’ Debate in Context 
 
From the discussion so far, it is clear that whilst Cowley identifies a downward trend in the 
age and parliamentary experience of party leaders, this tendency is less pronounced for 
members of the Cabinet. It is even less evident for junior ministers, whose average age on 
appointment has varied relatively little throughout the post-war period. One possible 
interpretation of these findings is that public profile is correlated with ‘noviceness’; that is, 
the more prominent the role, the younger and less experienced its incumbent is likely to be.  
This in turn may be linked to the rise of the mass media, which has led to an intensification of 
political marketing and a greater focus on the party leaders – a phenomenon termed the 
‘personalisation’ of politics.  
Some scholars claim that the process of personalisation began in the mid-1960s, when 
dramatic changes took place in the field of political communication.11 Thus, the 1970 general 
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election campaign saw the first biographical advertisement, entitled A Man to Trust, which 
drew on Edward Heath’s background and experience to demonstrate that he possessed the 
requisite qualities to be prime minister. Subsequent examples include the Kinnock Biopic 
(1987), John Major’s film The Journey (1992) and Molly Dineen’s ten-minute portrait of 
Tony Blair (1997). It is important to note, however, that the extent of the leader’s role in 
election broadcasts is dependent on whether he or she is perceived to be an asset to their 
party. This was made starkly clear in 2010, when Gordon Brown’s unpopularity ensured his 
complete absence from Labour’s broadcasts, whereas David Cameron and Nick Clegg both 
featured heavily in their parties’ adverts.   
The 2010 general election saw the first televised debates between the leaders of the 
three main parties. These events focused attention on the party leaders to an unprecedented 
degree and stimulated public interest in the campaign, though they ultimately had little effect 
on voters’ choices. Indeed, an Ipsos Mori analysis of voting intention polls found that, on 
average, support for the Conservatives fell from 38 per cent before the election was called to 
37 per cent on polling day, while Labour polled 30 per cent in both surveys and the Liberal 
Democrats increased their support from 19 to 24 per cent.12 Nevertheless, politicians and 
party strategists now believe that the debates have the potential to alter the outcome of the 
election, given that ‘a good performance can boost a leader’s authority, while a poor 
performance can greatly undermine it’. On this basis, it seems likely that an ability to perform 
well in televised debates will be a consideration in choosing future party leaders.  If he had 
stood for the Labour leadership, write Nicholas Allen, Judith Bara and John Bartle, Alistair 
Darling might one day have made ‘a good prime minister in the Clement Attlee mould.’ 
However, they continue, ‘it was Ed Miliband, a more confident television performer, who 
was chosen as Brown’s successor in September 2010’.13 Miliband was also the closest in age 
to Clegg and Cameron, and the fear that he would suffer by comparison with his opponents 
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may have been a factor in Darling’s decision not to run. Such apprehension would have been 
well-founded, due to the ageism that Menzies Campbell experienced after he became Liberal 
Democrat leader in 2006 at the age of 64.    
  The televised debates have reinforced the notion that the leader is the public face of 
their party. Perhaps more than ever, he or she is expected to ‘embody the aspirations or 
beliefs of [the] movement’ they represent.14 Given the imperative of modernisation in British 
politics, from Wilson’s pledge to harness the ‘white heat’ of technological revolution to 
Blair’s ‘New Labour, New Britain’ slogan and, more recently, Cameron’s vision of a 
‘modern, compassionate Conservatism’, it is hardly surprising that today’s party leaders are 
younger than their predecessors. After all, youth is inextricably associated with the spirit of 
change and renewal, and an older, more experienced statesman might struggle to represent 
these qualities convincingly. This in turn would risk damaging the credibility – and ultimately 
the popularity – of their party.  
Cabinet appointments can also contribute to a party’s public image. For instance, 
Wilson and Cameron demonstrated their modernising credentials by advancing younger 
women more rapidly than their overall average, while Blair promoted a larger number of 
women to his Cabinet than any other post-war Prime Minister. Similarly, Brown sought to 
renew his government by appointing the youngest and the least experienced Cabinet ministers 
of the post-war era. However, the Brown ministry is an exception, and youth is not normally 
a major factor when making Cabinet appointments. This is partly due to political 
considerations such as the need to reward party stalwarts after a long spell in opposition, but 
it is also attributable to the fact that the role of the Cabinet minister is not ‘personalised’ to 
the same extent as the party leadership and does not carry the same symbolic weight. 
Although still a focus of media attention, Cabinet ministers are not expected to embody the 
values of their party, to create a rapport with the electorate, or even to be particularly 
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likeable. Instead, they are required to be effective in their role and to ‘behave in a way that 
upholds the highest standards of propriety’;15 their age and public image are therefore of 
secondary importance. 
Junior ministers, meanwhile, have a lower public profile than their senior colleagues. 
There are some notable exceptions, such as Frank Field and Grant Shapps, but media 
engagement is generally a minor part of the job.16 After all, dozens of junior ministers cannot 
provide a focal point for public attention equivalent to that of the prime minister, given that 
they would soon generate mixed messages and thus damage party unity. In consequence, it is 
unsurprising that junior ministers have remained almost untouched by the growing 
personalisation of politics. With this in mind, it is worth noting that the average age on 
appointment to a junior ministerial post has varied little across the post-war period. While it 
is true that younger junior ministers are more likely to reach Cabinet than their older 
counterparts, this is part of a long-established pattern rather than a response to a changed 
political environment. Thus, there is no discernible trend towards the ‘novice junior minister’ 
in contemporary British politics.    
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have assessed the extent to which the average age and parliamentary 
experience of new Cabinet ministers has declined over the post-war period.  Although we 
find some evidence to support this, particularly in relation to the most recent Labour 
governments, we need to take into account other factors before we can fully accept the novice 
Cabinet minister thesis.  We also find that the trend towards ‘noviceness’ is considerably less 
pronounced among Cabinet ministers than it is for party leaders.  This, we argue, is due to the 
growing personalisation of politics, which has meant that ‘prime ministers are increasingly 
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monitored and assessed according to criteria that are quite different to those experienced by 
senior colleagues.’17  
The experience of William Hague is a case in point.  As leader of the Conservative 
Party, Hague failed to win over the public due to his aloof, ‘nerdy’ image.  Indeed, the efforts 
of his advisers to overturn this perception by setting up photo opportunities of him 
participating in ‘normal’ activities, such as visiting a theme park, were widely ridiculed.  His 
lack of authority contributed to the Conservatives’ second landslide defeat in 2001, after 
which he resigned the party leadership.  Since his return to the front benches as (Shadow) 
Foreign Secretary in 2005, however, Hague’s inability to connect with the public has ceased 
to matter and he is now judged by whether he performs his duties effectively.  His comment 
to the London Evening Standard in 2012 makes clear the contrast between the two roles: 
‘I’ve always been clear I came back into frontline politics to do foreign policy and that’s what 
I’m here doing.  When I was leader of the party there were always polls showing I was the 
least popular.  Since I took no notice of these things I’ve become more popular.  So I propose 
to go on taking no notice whatsoever’.18   
Some commentators have observed that today’s Cabinet ministers are younger and 
less experienced than their predecessors. They support this claim with examples from the 
Brown government, notably Ruth Kelly, David Miliband and James Purnell, who left 
politics at the age of 40, 47 and 38 respectively.19  Our analysis challenges this argument 
by showing that the Brown ministry was an exception and that there is in fact no 
significant downward trend in the age and experience of Cabinet ministers since 1945.  It 
may be the case that the intense focus on novice party leaders has shone a spotlight on the 
select group of younger Cabinet ministers, leaving the older majority in the shadows.  If so, 
the claim that we are witnessing the rise of the novice Cabinet minister is more a 
consequence of the personalisation of politics than evidence of an emerging ‘cult of youth’. 
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